In a speech in the European Parliament (EP) on 15 September 1970 the then new President of the European Commission, the Italian Christian Democrat Franco Maria Malfatti (1970 Malfatti ( -1972 officially addressed the issue of the environment as a new policy objective of the European Communities (EC) for the first time. He placed great emphasis on the 'heavy and unexpected costs' of 'economic and industrial progress', such as the 'destruction of natural assets by industry'. These two episodes are illustrative of two issues that are at the core of this article. First, when the environment emerged as a new political concern in the late 1960s, which integrated previously separate issues such as nature protection, resource conservation and pollution control into the new comprehensive political concept of the environment, 5 IOs quickly started taking an active interest in this new area and sought to shape policy contents. IOs seemed ideally suited to deal with environmental problems that often cut across national borders and apparently required international solutions and the setting of new international norms, notably in the area of pollution control. Fighting pollution was the most pressing issue in the early 1970s. The massive economic growth of the postwar period -accompanied by the rise of mass consumerism -had caused unprecedented local, but increasingly also cross-border pollution problems. Moreover, some of these problems were caused by manufactured products, notably vehicles, which were traded internationally. Various IOs could also build on some of their earlier work in nature protection and scientific cooperation, as activities that had contributed to placing this new issue on the international political agenda in the first place. 6 In the early 1970s both the OECD and the EC started to address the new political issue of the environment almost simultaneously. With its Environmental Committee, the OECD was the first IO worldwide to set up a separate institutional forum to discuss environmental concerns. 7 Despite lacking the formal legal basis within its founding treaties, the EC devised a comprehensive policy programme, the Environmental Action Programme of November 1973, which laid the basis for subsequent policy making, until the policy area was officially included in the Single European Act of 1987. 8 Moreover, both IOs developed normative principles for the field in order to ensure a cohesive approach to the difficult, often very technical issues of environmental policy, such as the principle of precaution, which states that under conditions of scientific insecurity about environmental hazards, citizens should not be exposed to excessive risks, or the principle of prevention, which seeks to avoid pollution already at its source. Among these principles, the polluter-pays principle (PPP) was most prominently discussed, as it did not only have moral implications, by clarifying who should bear the cost of pollution and pay for remedies. Economists in particular also found the principle attractive as a policy instrument, because they expected that making the polluter pay would steer citizens and business in the desired direction of environmentally friendly States. This perception has only been challenged very recently. 12 In contrast to the EC, the OECD has always been viewed as an economic organisation. As a think-tank of the developed countries, it has not just been committed to promoting trade, business and economic growth, but it was also central to establishing the "growth paradigm", the expectation of everincreasing economic expansion as the normative point of reference in postwar economic and political debates. 13 Environmental policy, in contrast, today plays no prominent role in the OECD's public image, even though -as recent research has highlighted -for a brief period in the early 1970s, the OECD was among the first IOs to address such issues as 'problems of modern society'. However, after the oil crisis, by 1977-79, the OECD turned into a leading promoter of neoliberal economic growth policies. 14 Against this backdrop, this article suggests that this contrast might be exaggerated, at least with a view to the early 1970s.
Clearly, both organisations were committed to economic growth, but were also increasingly aware of its negative side effects. Both drew on the insights of environmental economics in order to reconcile environmental objectives and economic growth, rather than buying into the Club of Rome's critique of continued exponential growth (Limits to Growth, 1972) , a critique that many environmentalists shared, however.
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This article analyses how both the OECD and the EC approached environmental policy during its formative period in the early 1970s, to what extent they borrowed ideas from other IOs, such as the Council of Europe, and from each other, and which role institutional linkages played in this respect. Focusing on the PPP enshrined almost simultaneously both at the OECD and the EC, the article will assess the routes along which policy ideas travelled. It will discuss the importance of experts and expertise, the role of inter-organisational competition and the selective nature of transfers. 16 The article argues that the differing definitions of the principle were due to political considerations, including the balance of member state interests and the 'fit' with existing institutional conditions and policies of the recipient organisation.
To examine these inter-organisational links, the article first provides an overview of the The OECD's route to environmental policy was informed by two different, but converging concerns. First, this new interest emerged from the OECD's focus on research cooperation.
Since the 1960s, this work had included research on pollution. 29 Secondly, as the organisation was committed to economic growth, it came to be concerned with the economic impact of environmental policies. To pre-empt negative effects, the OECD first set up an 'ad-hoc preparatory Committee' 'on activities concerning environmental problems linked to economic growth' in early 1970. Its purpose was to 'identify non-desirable consequences of economic growth' and 'promote measures nationally and internationally to eliminate these'. While it thus addressed the costs that Malfatti highlighted in his speech, the committee was also set up to 'evaluate the impact of these measures on economic growth', -i.e. those costs that van
Lennep had talked about. 30 In November 1970, the OECD established a full-fledged Environmental Committee. Here, NATO served as a point of reference, which is not surprising due to a largely overlapping membership, and a strong role of the United States within the OECD. Early OECD discussions framed the environmental problem in the language NATO had introduced, notably with an emphasis on 'problems of modern society'
and the need to cooperate with NATO along with other IOs 'active in the field of the CCMS', such as the EC.
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In an increasingly crowded field, as in so many other policy domains, the EC was a latecomer rather than a pioneer. 32 Like the OECD, the EC had been established to reconstruct Western follow'. This prescription outlined the main elements of the subsequent debate about the PPP. 35 In January 1971, the Atlantic Council -together with another think tank, the Batelle Institute -organised a major conference in Washington D.C. to promote these issues, and
Harned was one the three editors of the book emerging from the event. 36 
The Polluter-Pays Principle and International Organisations
What is the PPP, and how did the IOs active in this field define it during the 1960s and 1970s? The notion that those causing harm to someone else -for instance by spoiling the water or polluting the air -should be held responsible for the damage, is an old legal principle dating back to the Romans. In the nineteenth century, those affected by pollution occasionally took industrialists to court and forced them to pay compensation. 40 During the second half of the twentieth century, debates reached a new level of sophistication, informed by the development of postwar neoclassical, rational-choice based economics. Economists modelled economic actors as rational interest-maximisers, who would always select the most advantageous option. Economists did not just argue that they were able to predict, but also to guide actors' behaviour. If policy makers offered the right kind of incentive, like the carrot for the donkey, businesses and consumers would behave in the fashion desired. This assumption also formed the basis for the field of environmental economics, which started booming in the late 1960s.
Environmental economics reframed the problem of the allocation of the cost of pollution to those who caused it from a fairness issue to an issue of economic efficiency. 41 The Canadian economist John Dales, who is widely recognised as the inventor of emissions trading, 42 demanded in his much-quoted book Pollution, Property and Prices of 1968 that the costs of negative externalities (such as pollution) should be internalised into the cost of production. 43 Such an approach had two important advantages, at least from the viewpoint of the advocates of market-based policy solutions: First, the PPP created a level playing field and fair competition. If all participants in the market had to include the cost of pollution, nobody would benefit from the undue subsidy that the continued externalisation of costs effectively meant. Secondly, and more importantly, the PPP would quasi-automatically lead to the most efficient solution to the environmental problem. If pollution was given a price tag, this created incentives to avoid and reduce it. Market forces would advance the search for the cheapestand thus most efficient -remedy to the pollution problem. 44 Hence, environmental economists with their pro-market leanings argued that such a market-based instrument would be more effective than the comparatively inflexible method of command-and-control.
However, in order to function fairly and efficiently, the principle needed to be applied without exemptions, such as state subsidies for anti-pollution measures. 45 This persuasive economic rationale clearly appealed to the many economists working for the OECD and the EC. Hence, it did not remain an abstract part of academic reasoning, but was repeatedly spelled out to legitimate OECD and EC recommendations.
Although it is routinely associated with the EC and the OECD, 46 it was another IO that initially flagged the PPP before it arrived to these two IOs. Anticipating implementation problems, the recommendation accepted three reasons for exemptions: First, it recognised that the cost of rapidly introducing environmental measures could lead to significant 'socio-economic problems'. Secondly, it accepted that innovation might require subsidies, such as 'experimentation with new pollution control technologies'.
Thirdly, the principle was not supposed to thwart states' capacity to engage in social and regional policies, where subsidies were routinely used to act upon 'serious interregional imbalances'. However, exemptions were to be applied in a 'selective and restricted' manner, to sectors in economic distress, and limited in time. 52 In order to ensure the actual implementation of the recommendation, the OECD relied on a strategy of 'naming and shaming', a common instrument IOs have been using until today,
given their lack of formal powers to make binding decisions. 53 The recommendation thus introduced a notification and consultation procedure: member states introducing state aids or tax breaks were required to notify the OECD secretariat in advance; other member states had the right to be consulted. 54 All in all, the OECD did not just contribute to a more fine-grained definition of the principle, based on the state of the art in economics, in comparison to the ethical approach of the Council of Europe. The OECD also developed a more sophisticated strategy to induce member states to actually implement it.
'The polluter pays principle … has been invented by the Commission', Michel Carpentier, the first and long-time director of the Commission's Service for the Environment and Consumer Protection (SEPC), an economist by training and an activist promoter of environmental policy, claimed in a recent oral history interview. 55 In actual fact, however, the EC institutions imported the principle, mainly from the OECD, and Carpentier was himself involved in this transfer process. Apart from directly drawing on debates in environmental economics and existing national laws, EC institutions, notably the European Parliament and the European Commission, borrowed from the work of several IOs. 56 While it lacked decision-making powers at the time, the European Parliament was an important agenda-setter and mediator. 57 the Recommendation specified a large number of exemptions, notably regarding subsidies within a number of the EC policy areas, such as the 'investment affecting environmental protection benefit from aid intended to solve certain industrial, agricultural or regional structural problems.' 68 All in all, however, the EC thus entered the debate rather late and its eventual course of action was strongly inspired by other IOs, most notably the OECD.
The PPP in the OECD and the EC
When defining the PPP, which had come to be framed as an issue of environmental economics, both the OECD and the EC heavily relied on economic expertise. Experts also helped connecting the debates between institutions. However, the two IOs organised their expert consultation in slightly different ways, which contributed to different policy outcomes, notably regarding the politically contentious issue of exemptions to the PPP.
The OECD's committees did not just provide expertise, in fact, they frequently predetermined decisions. Very often, their recommendations -such as the one on the PPP -were basically rubber-stamped at ministerial level. The Environmental Committee and its subcommittees were composed of officials from the relevant ministries and agencies, notably those responsible for the environment as well as trade and industry, and of government-appointed experts. These included scientists, planners and business representatives, for instance a representative of the German subsidiary of the multinational oil company BP. 69 The experts' dual role was to provide scientific, economic, legal and business expertise and experience, but also to represent their respective national governments or relevant business interests.
In order to address environmental issues with economic implications more adequately, the
OECD's Environmental Committee in 1971 established a Subcommittee of Economic
Experts. 70 When this subcommittee dealt with the PPP as one of its first issues, the experts unanimously praised its economic efficiency, 'providing for a pollution control policy at the least cost'. Nonetheless, the experts were not ignorant about its policy implications. Indeed, 'some delegates' stressed the need for exceptions, too, as policy makers had to account for 'competing objectives', including 'employment policy, regional policy' and local concerns.
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The subcommittee did not only rely on its own members' expertise, but organised a broad consultation process to get an overview of the field. In the summer of 1971 it organised a seminar on 'Problems of Environmental Economics' at the OECD, which brought together a large number of economists discussing questions of cost allocation and trade. 72 On the basis of this very broad process of gathering economic expertise, the OECD developed its first, rather general Recommendation of May 1972.
For its 1974 Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle the OECD did not simply rely on the theoretical debate in economics, but studied concrete reports from various member countries, only to realise that actual policies in place routinely deviated from the PPP. In order to gain acceptance and to offset the cost of new anti-pollution measures, environmental policy makers frequently relied on aids and subsidies. 73 After lengthy negotiations, the Environmental Committee in late 1973 agreed on those exemptions that made it to the final Recommendation: namely 'transitional arrangements', if environmental measures policy were rapidly introduced, and in cases 'when socio-economic policy objectives and the employment in a certain region would be adversely affected'. It also clarified that '[a]id to promote research and development' was not considered 'inconsistent with PPP'. 74 This result was a clear departure from the rigour of the economic rationale.
Instead, it was the effect of political negotiations. Notably the Italian representatives had repeatedly stressed the need to grant assistance to new plants in 'regions with heavy diseconomies'. 75 After the Environmental Committee discussion, the PPP thus started to look like a Swiss Emmental cheese -hollowed out by numerous exceptions.
When the European Commission proposed a recommendation on the PPP, its work was connected to the OECD's experience in more than one way. Clearly, it drew on the example the OECD had set, as the Italian commissioner responsible for environmental affairs, Carlo Scarascia-Mugnozza, liberally acknowledged in a speech in front of the OECD ministers in November 1974. 76 Like the OECD Environmental Committee, the Commission sought to base its proposal on external economic expertise, but it opted for a different procedure. Instead of a broad consultation of experts, the European Commission only commissioned two expert reports. 77 The choice of the two experts was revealing: The author of the first report was Achille
Hannequart, a Belgian economist and senior advisor to the Belgian economic programming office. Hannequart was also the Belgian representative in the OECD's Subcommittee of Economic Experts, thus creating a strong link to OECD debates. 78 By contrast, the other expert, Harald Jürgensen, was a Keynesian economics professor from Hamburg and an academic entrepreneur with a long-time connection to the EC. Jürgensen had worked on EC- demonstrate that it was acting independently. 85 Indeed, the Commission's PPP proposal included many more exemptions than the OECD's definition. As such, it reflected important political considerations: for one, the interest of member states who did not want any interference with their regional policies, notably Italy;
for another, the EC's interest to prevent any limitation of existing EC redistributive EC policies, such as social and regional policies, which were expanding in the course of the 1970s. 86 The EC approach was more lenient than that of the OECD, allowing for exemptions for three types of reasons: first, difficulties to adapt to environmental policy rules, be it for economic, technical or social reasons. In this case, exceptions should be temporary. Secondly, a blanket exception was granted where other EC policy objectives ('regional, social, research, industrial, conjunctural') interfered with environmental objectives. The wording ensured that the application of the principle remained secondary to regional policy. Thirdly, costs of services in the general public interest, such as local waste treatment plants, were exempt from the PPP. It remained permissible to finance the operation of such installations via taxes. 87 Similar to the direction taken at the level of its expert committees, the Commission's proposal was full of exceptions. This is clearly contrary to the widespread belief that the EC and the EU stand for prioritising environmental policy and thus the application of its fundamental principles, whereas the OECD embodies a pro-business approach less concerned with its environmental implications.
The Usually a pro-integration country, also Italy was against a binding directive, because the Italian government feared that a strict implementation of the PPP would threaten the Italian policy practice, namely granting massive subsidies for the economically depressed South.
Like they had done in the OECD, the Italians insisted on a more generous interpretation of the PPP. In July 1974, they even proposed not to consider the list of exemptions exhaustive. Such a proposal would have rendered the EC's version of the PPP meaningless. 89 Conversely, the idea of the PPP seemed to have particular appeal in the Netherlands. It was the Dutch parliamentary rapporteur Oele who had placed the concept on the EC agenda.
Moreover, due to its geography on the lower Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt, the country suffered from massive water pollution, while their neighbours upstream caused most of the damage. In any case, the Dutch delegation took a particularly strict position on exemptions to the PPP.
Referring explicitly to the OECD and emphasising the need to cooperate with this IO, the Dutch representatives argued not to go beyond the OECD's list of exemptions, and was particularly critical of the blanket exemptions for certain EC policy areas.
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Although the processes of establishing the PPP in the OECD and the EC shared a surprising number of common features and were interlinked in multiple ways, notably through the involvement of experts, both IOs arrived at different conclusions. The OECD remained much closer to the rigour of its economist advisers, while a political logic mattered more in the EC context. Institutional differences equally played a role for the selective appropriation of the concept: As OECD recommendations were non-binding, accepting stricter rules posed less of a problem to national negotiators, who could point to their superiors in national capitals that technically the implementation of IO recommendations was voluntary. The political stakes and the level of commitment was different in the EC, given that it was capable of making binding rules, and indeed a substantial number of governments would have preferred a binding directive. Against the backdrop of this 'shadow' of binding rules, the EC allowed for more generous exemptions. 91 Institutional differences also played a role in a further respect.
The principle did not ideally 'fit' with existing national and EC policies, which relied heavily on subsidies. Those, however, were anathema to the environmental economics view of the PPP. Such a lack of fit frequently limits the acceptability of policies, as scholars of policy implementation have highlighted. This may also explain the reluctance of EC policy-makers to implement the PPP more strictly.
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Conclusions
Research on IOs usually tends to treat these institutions and their respective policies in isolation, at best considering IOs' internal politics and the role of their leading member states. In general, the EC was more often a receiver of policy approaches formulated elsewhere than a pioneer. Moreover, the relations between the EC and other IOs were not necessarily only cooperative, but at times competitive. 93 In fact, the OECD and other IOs had started dealing with environmental challenges earlier than the EC. This also holds true for the PPP as the main focus of this article. And there is a second area in which views of the EC's role in international policy-making are often distorted. Advocates of EC action -such as the authors of the first EP reports on the new policy domain -often referred to the EC's superiority thanks to its capacity to make binding laws. For the PPP, member states however opted for a non-binding recommendation, exactly because many of them feared an all too strict application of the principle. Hence, the EC did not always take binding decisions. And since the legal and political stakes tended to be higher in this forum than in other IOs, it sometimes opted for a more lenient approach. The PPP is a perfect example: here, the OECD adopted a much stricter application of the insights of environmental economics in order to achieve a cleaner environment, falsifying the idea that this IO stands for a pro-business line, while the EC was more concerned with environmental issues. Indeed, the fundamental difference between the OECD and the EC concerning the PPP was not premised on the familiar conflict between ecology vs. economy, as the speeches by Malfatti and van Lennep seem to suggest, but on different perceptions of the role of the state and the market: while the OECD was more committed to market-based instruments already in the 1970s, the EC only converted to this agenda in the 1990s. Again models from the United States played an important role as did policy experiments that had been undertaken in some of the member states, notably in the Netherlands. These insights and ideas were mediated by leading Dutch officials in the Commission's Environment directorate general in the 1990s. At the beginning of the debate, other IOs also played an important role, for Western Europe particularly the Council of Europe. In fact, it had a pioneering role in environmental policy amongst the various IOs and also with regard to the PPP. Very soon, however, the Council of Europe was marginalised -as in several of the other policy domains covered in this special section. The international debate concerning the PPP was increasingly driven by an economic rationale -a logic that did not fit the competences of the Council of Europe. Thus the Council of Europe soon lost in importance, leaving the pride of place to organisations with strong economic credentials, most importantly the OECD and the EC. As early as 1972, the Council of Europe even encouraged its member states to actually use the OECD to help avoid new trade barriers due to environmental regulation. 95 Thus, within the course of a few years, the OECD and the EC became the central IOs in Western Europe in this field, and the main points of reference for the principle in international law. 96 Cooperation, competition and crowding out thus led to a new division of labour between various IOs in Western Europe. This also helps to explain why by today, the EU has crowded out all other European IOs in the areas of environmental policy, as it did in many other policy fields. As this article has shown, this was a rather unlikely perspective when the whole debate started in the early 1970s, and the EU's eventual rise to prominence owes a lot to the inter-organisational links to a whole host of other IOs.
